


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Delusions of Grand

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Review Essay

Delusions of Grand

Russell Crandall

What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush

Hal Brands. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014.
£18.50/\$29.95. 273 pp.

In late January 2015, retired general James Mattis, former chief of US Central Command, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that, with threats like the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) seemingly on the ascent, the United States needed a ‘refreshed national strategy’, and that the Obama White House needed to shape global events, not merely react to them.¹ Possibly unknown to Mattis was the fact that the belief that Washington should define the world – and not vice versa – has vexed every presidential administration since the Second World War. Indeed, there is little that executive-branch foreign-policy operators fear more than the label of ‘ad-hocism’ that Mattis obliquely threw at Obama.

The common-sense response to counterproductive crisis management is to have an overarching strategy that defines the what, how and why of American foreign policy. Yet, as the young American diplomatic historian Hal Brands makes clear in his well-written and valuable book *What Good is Grand Strategy?*, it is far easier to desire a grand strategy than to devise one.

Covering three Cold War administrations (Truman, Nixon–Kissinger and Reagan) and one post-9/11 (George W. Bush), Brands’s book makes

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overwhelmingly clear that even the most successful efforts to chart an American grand strategy have included a great deal of ad-hocism. Contrary to a definition of foreign policy as the sum of a country's interactions with the world, Brands considers grand strategy – a 'most slippery and widely abused' term – the 'intellectual architecture' that ensures policies are pursued that maximise a country's core interests. At its finest, grand strategy consists of an 'integrated scheme of interests, threats, resources, and policies' (p. 3). He adds that grand strategy must be well developed but not necessarily formalised; some nations might in fact have very good reasons for not articulating their strategy, but instead privately act upon a compelling course of ideas and action. Brands further believes that policymakers' decisions are shaped by the confines of their own intelligence, as well as a 'potent mixture' of emotions, ideology and past experience (p. 11).

Not to be seen simply as a struggle against a single foe, grand strategy entails a contest against the complexity and disorder that dominate the international arena in both peacetime and war. This inescapable chaos helps explain why grand strategy is almost never made in the best of circumstances (p. 10). As grand strategist extraordinaire Henry Kissinger put it in 1970, 'The tragic aspect of policymaking is that when your scope for action is greatest, the knowledge on which you can base this action is always at a minimum. When your knowledge is greatest, the scope for action often has disappeared' (p. 11).


Saving the world?

In 2009, former Council on Foreign Relations president Leslie Gelb reiterated the commonly held interpretation of the initial post-Second World War era as a time when the United States largely succeeded in checking Soviet expansionism and stabilising the global order. 'The Truman team's strategy marked the golden age of US foreign policy,' he said, 'as glorious in our history as the founding fathers' creation of the Constitution' (p. 17). Members of the Truman administration themselves have endorsed this interpretation: secretary of state Dean Acheson gave his memoir the modest title of *Present at the Creation*, while presidential adviser Clark Clifford later reflected, 'we saved Europe and we saved the world' (p. 17).

This ostensible golden age began when the United States' military victory in the Pacific and Atlantic theatres effectively placed the country in an entirely different strategic posture. As Army Chief of Staff George Marshall put it, 'We are now concerned with the peace of the entire world' (p. 19) Yet, despite having an economy five times as large as the nearest challengers', and being responsible for three-fourths of the world's military spending, the ascendant American superpower was also sobered by the painful reminder that Pearl Harbor had shown 'Fortress America' was not impregnable.

By early 1946, Truman's concern about maintaining peace in the world had become associated with an awareness that the Soviet Union represented an existential threat, most acutely in Europe. In the accidental president's estimation, 'Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language another war is in the making. I do not think we should play compromise any longer' (p. 21). American diplomat George Kennan's 'Long Telegram' and subsequent anonymous essay in *Foreign Affairs* crystallised these growing fears by explaining that Moscow's insatiable aggression was fuelled by Russian insecurities and Marxist-Leninist ideology. Kennan's steely yet patient containment was designed to resist the Russians with 'unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world' (p. 22). Brand's narrative reminds us that, despite the gushing commentary of authors like Gelb, containment did not emerge fully formed from Kennan's imagination; it was an idea that had to be developed amidst a host of crises. In Dean Acheson's later estimation, Kennan's containment was a general call to action, not a specific strategy.

Washington's first emergency was to come in Western Europe where, according to a despondent Winston Churchill, by early 1947 the centre of Western civilisation had become a 'rubble heap, a charnel house, a breeding ground for pestilence and hate' (p. 25). By the end of the year, America's collective defence pact and pledge to defend Western Europe 'at the Rhine' if faced with aggression represented, in Truman's words, 'a shield against



aggression and the fear of aggression' (p. 35). In addition to NATO, the Marshall Plan and the Berlin airlift also helped reinforce containment's test case in Western Europe. While these vast and complex policies are indeed remarkable, as those who orchestrated them and subsequent observers alike have concluded, Brands rightly points out that Truman's resolve in the case of NATO was in fact reactive given that no prior plan for a peacetime alliance had been envisioned.

Written by State Department official Paul Nitze, the seminal NSC-68 planning document reaffirmed Kennan's concept of containment, yet it also upped the ante by declaring the Cold War the product of the 'perverted faith' of Soviet communism, which it described as 'slavery' and the 'most contagious idea in history' (p. 45). North Korea's invasion of South Korea in June 1950 confirmed to Truman that 'communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war'. This hysteria was only reinforced by the Chinese counter-offensive in Korea in November 1950, one of the most stunning military setbacks in US military history. As Truman lamented, 'we are faced with the most terrible situation since Pearl Harbor' (p. 50).

Truman concluded from the Korea debacle that low-cost containment would no longer work. Thus, his initial request for military spending of \$13.9 billion for fiscal year 1951 ballooned to \$43bn by the time of its final authorisation. The following year it rose again to \$56.9bn. The Air Force doubled in size; the Marine Corps jumped from 74,000 to 246,000 troops; and the atomic arsenal went from 299 weapons in 1950 to 841 two years later, giving Washington a 17-to-1 edge over Moscow in nuclear weapons. Yet, the belief among American policymakers that it was necessary continually to confront real and imagined threats, such as the 'dead-end colonial conflict' in Indochina, ultimately proved self-defeating – and thus undermined the otherwise remarkable grand strategy developed 'during the creation'. Even Truman came to see this, concluding: 'Our resources are not inexhaustible. We can't go on like this' (p. 56). Still, Brands concludes that the Truman administration's grand strategy, while often messier and more unpleasant than remembered, nonetheless merits its seemingly unrivalled golden-age reputation.

The shine comes off

Taking office in early 1969, President Richard Nixon had the bad luck of governing at a time when containment was in deep crisis. Most visibly and painfully demonstrated by the quagmire in Vietnam, America's waning power and internal divisions were undermining its post-war hegemony. In 1968, Kissinger acknowledged, 'We require a new burst of creativity' (p. 59). The former Harvard professor served as Nixon's national security advisor from 1969–75 and was secretary of state from 1973–77, extending into the Ford administration following Nixon's resignation. Both Nixon and his most polarising foreign-policy adviser believed that the United States could transcend its relative decline by imposing its will on the world. Both men had concluded that President Lyndon Johnson had gambled American prestige on a 'small peninsula on a major continent' in the mistaken belief that Washington should uphold an unbroken containment perimeter in Vietnam. According to Nixon, 'While the United States is tied down in Viet Nam, the Soviets are loose in the world – free to challenge us in the Mediterranean, free to move into the vacuum left by retreating colonial powers in the Middle East and along the vast rimland of the Indian Ocean' (p. 65).

Dismissive of the untidy democracy impeding their 'long view' machinations, Nixon and Kissinger accumulated a sizeable – and to many, worrisome – concentration of power in the executive branch, specifically within the White House. Both men believed foreign policy was too critical to be left to a 'self-interested bureaucracy', and that toughness and credibility were indispensable. Of special significance for Brands's story is their acknowledgement of the boundaries of American power and influence. Likely the most self-aware practitioner of grand strategy of those profiled in the book, Kissinger was eager to 'rescue an element of choice from the pressure of circumstance' (p. 63).

Drawing on the logic that underpinned a set of policies known as detente, Nixon and Kissinger's central approach entailed a more 'sustainable relationship' with its global rival, the Soviet Union. Kissinger recalled, 'We were determined to resist Soviet adventures, at the same time we were prepared to negotiate about a genuine easing of tensions ... We would

pursue a carrot-and-stick approach, ready to impose penalties for adventurism, willing to expand relations in the context of responsible behavior' (p. 68). To achieve this end, the foreign-policy duo insisted upon 'linkage' (that is, tying dealings with the Russians on key nuclear negotiations such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with their perceived actions in the Third World), which was intended to give Moscow 'reasons for adhering to an acceptable code of global conduct' (p. 69). Brands argues that, for all its failings, detente reduced superpower frictions and provided a 'much-needed breather for a country suffering from strategic exhaustion' (p. 86).

Especially given how, in the 1960s, Washington had been 'groaning under the weight of containing two powerful rivals', Brands considers Sino-American rapprochement a 'grand strategic coup of the first order' that fundamentally shifted the Cold War line-up. Now it was the Soviets that had to bear the weight of two against one. Or, as Mao Zedong told Kissinger, 'We can work together to commonly deal with a bastard' (p. 80).

By the time he was President Gerald Ford's secretary of state, Kissinger's cold-blooded realpolitik had led him to reassure an Argentine diplomat representing a junta then beginning to unleash a dirty war against its own people that 'I have an old-fashioned view that friends ought to be supported' (p. 92) For Kissinger, repression was disagreeable, but instability was worse. Like Nixon, Kissinger thought of human-rights advocacy as 'sentimental nonsense' (his words) at a time when Moscow was gaining a strategic advantage. As he told Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet's foreign minister, 'The State Department is made up of people who have a vocation for the ministry ... Because there were not enough churches for them, they went into the Department of State' (p. 93).

Nixon and Kissinger's grand strategy eventually slammed into a swelling backlash against the imperial presidency that had begun to emerge under his Democratic predecessor, especially in relation to Vietnam. Liberals turned more dovish in response to the torment of Vietnam, while conservatives and neoconservatives became more hawkish. In due course, Nixon and Kissinger's heroic grand strategy had been 'exposed as deeply problematic in its own right' (p. 61). Congress, for one, was in no mood to tolerate more executive-branch excesses such as US support for the coup that overthrew

the democratically elected, Marxist president of Chile, Salvador Allende. To this end, it passed legislation requiring the State Department to submit reports on human rights in countries that received US foreign aid. According to Brands's analysis of Kissinger, 'The statesman who prided himself on vision did not understand that he was living amid a human rights revolution, and his policies proved politically untenable as a result' (p. 93).

In an especially provocative passage, Brands writes that Nixon and Kissinger's decision to conduct air attacks on North Vietnam, to bomb and invade neutral Cambodia, and to support repressive regimes in Pakistan and Argentina could at least be defended strategically, but were self-defeating politically in the more anti-war and sceptical post-Vietnam and -Watergate era. These sorts of controversial policies also reinforced the growing sense that American foreign policy was morally corrupted. It is not a coincidence that the incoming president, Jimmy Carter, blasted his predecessors' cynical and counterproductive diplomacy and promised the American nation a more transparent and ethical approach to the world.

Challenging detente

The Republican Party's 1976 presidential candidate, Ronald Reagan, also attacked detente, yet unlike Carter, whose own attack was based on human-rights grounds, Reagan believed the Kissinger-hatched approach abdicated America's moral standing vis-à-vis an axiomatically evil, bipolar foe. Echoing biographer Lou Cannon's masterful *Reagan: A Life in Politics*, Brands draws the refreshing conclusion that Reagan's reputation for superficiality was itself superficial; the Great Communicator had little sense for policy minutiae, but possessed 'sharp geopolitical instincts'. As one aide quipped, 'He can sift out what matters from ten thousand bureaucratic details in a remarkable manner' (p. 106).

For Brands, Reagan's presidential grand strategy was based on a central premise: the Russians were simultaneously strong militarily (in part due to detente-era naivety that saw Washington fall behind in the arms race) and weak economically and morally. In the president's imagining, 'The Soviet Union is economically on the ropes – they are selling rat meat on the market. This is the time to punish them.' Why, Reagan wondered, had

the Soviets obtained Western loans and technology granted under detente while escaping criticism of their 'abhorrent internal practices'? As he put it, 'Are we not helping a Godless tyranny maintain its hold on millions of helpless people? Wouldn't those helpless victims have a better chance of becoming free if their slave masters [*sic*] regime collapsed economically?' (p. 114). Thus, given that by the late 1970s America's standing vis-à-vis the Soviets had bottomed out, Washington needed to ramp up the (largely military) pressure. For Reagan, 'A sound East-West military balance [was] absolutely essential.' To this end, he embarked upon a Truman-like military build-up: the defence budget leaped from \$185bn in 1980 to \$320bn in 1988. For Reagan, amassing *Trident* nuclear missiles, MX intercontinental missiles and B-1 and B-2 bombers, and the deployment of *Tomahawk* cruise missiles and *Pershing II* intermediate-range ballistic missiles to Western Europe, were necessary to 'offset the shadow cast by the [Soviet-deployed] SS-20s' (p. 111).

Reagan matched his material escalation with an equally aggressive and unapologetic moral war. The West, he predicted, would contain and 'transcend communism. It won't bother to ... denounce it, it will dismiss it as some bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages are even now being written' (p. 116). But despite this strident rhetoric and military build-up, Brands paints Reagan as less than eager to see the Cold War continue indefinitely. In April 1981, for example, he lifted the grain embargo imposed by Carter after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Reagan's grand strategy was also predicated on Washington-supported armed and civilian anti-Soviet regimes and movements in the global periphery, such as in Afghanistan, or closer to home in the Caribbean Basin. The thinking was alarmingly simple: hold the line against communism and roll back if possible. Within weeks of taking office, Reagan told his team that El Salvador was a good starting point. 'A victory there could set an example,' he claimed (p. 113) In response to the rise of the independent trade union in Poland in the early 1980s, which challenged Soviet domination behind the Iron Curtain, Reagan increased Voice of America broadcasts and sanctioned the Polish and Soviet governments, writing in his diary, 'Here is the first major break in the Red Dike' (p. 114).

Brands notes that, in the Third World, the Reagan administration's 'anything goes Cold War mentality' found itself allied with some 'truly awful characters', such as the Salvadoran military (p. 140). The White House-directed scheme to covertly fund the anti-Marxist Nicaraguan resistance groups erupted into the Iran–Contra scandal that tarnished Reagan's presidency. At the same time, Reagan's covert support for the mujahideen resistance in Afghanistan might be seen as the Reagan doctrine's 'crown jewel'. Yet even this apparent success was not immune from blowback, which became fully apparent on 11 September 2001. According to Reagan adviser Robert Gates, 'Our operations had lingering and dangerous aftereffects' (p. 141).

Brands is convinced that Reagan presided over a remarkable improvement in America's 'geopolitical fortunes'. By the end of his presidency, the Soviets were on the defensive, 'retreating on virtually all fronts', and both sides were openly acknowledging the end of the Cold War. In a critical, disinterested and nuanced passage of a kind often lacking in studies of Reagan's legacy, Brands speculates that the president's grand strategy did not cause the Soviet crisis but did allow Washington to 'exploit its geopolitical effects' (p. 119).

Brands adds that that the former actor and California governor benefited from the good fortune of being president when the post-Vietnam American psyche had begun to heal, profound problems in the Soviet model had emerged and an 'entirely different sort of leader' in the form of Mikhail Gorbachev had come to power in Moscow. Brands adds that Reagan's sky-is-the-limit strategy no doubt succeeded in straining the Soviet economy but, when combined with domestic tax cuts, 'exerted great pressure on *American* finances as well' (p. 139).

The burdens of grandness

Given that foreign policy had become a secondary issue for most of the American public, it was not especially surprising that the Republican candidate in the 2000 presidential election, George W. Bush, promised a more modest approach to the world. Certainly, the quiet and seemingly non-ideological early months of his presidency suggested that Bush's grand strategy was intentionally not very grand. Yet, within weeks of the 9/11 attacks, his administration had begun calling for enduring military

dominance and pre-emptive and unilateral strikes against 'gathering threats', and treating rogue states pursuing weapons of mass destruction 'as no less a menace than terrorism' (p. 151). Speaking on 20 September, for example, Bush said, 'Our war on terror begins with Al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.' For secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld, the post-9/11 moment offered the United States the 'kind of opportunities that World War II offered, to refashion much of the world' (p. 154). For Brands, this post-9/11 maximalist grand strategy entailed an 'unapologetically hegemonic' approach to the world, underpinned by a deep faith in the efficacy of the US military (p. 55).

The newly muscled Bush doctrine appeared to have a stunningly successful launch in the form of the lightning operations to defeat the Taliban and disperse al-Qaeda elements in Afghanistan in late 2001, and in the initial overthrow of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's regime in April 2003. The linchpin of this strategy, of course, was the invasion of Iraq. Getting rid of Saddam was intended, in one masterful stroke, to recast the strategic outlook of the Middle East and beyond, 'opening the door to a new era of global freedom and U.S. influence' (p. 164). Refreshingly, Brands points out that America's invasion was not a 'precooked conspiracy', given that, before 9/11, Bush had shown little desire to pursue regime change in Iraq. After 9/11, Bush did not necessarily believe that Saddam had been directly behind the attacks, but did believe that Iraq harboured terrorist groups and held a threatening arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Brands cites British historian Lawrence Freedman, who notes that 'worst-case analysis had suddenly gained a new credibility' (p. 160). As the influential Defense Department official Paul Wolfowitz put it at the time, 'Disarming Saddam ... is a very good demonstration' (p. 160). Iraq also showed how Bush relied almost entirely on the 'rapid, precise application' of American military might and assumed that the Middle East and wider world would accept the aggressive use of American military power.

Unlike many critics then and now, Brands is not convinced that the democracy-promotion element of the Bush doctrine was solely 'moralistic window dressing' for ulterior motives for invading Iraq. Bush went to war in

Iraq to oust a perceived threat, but as his influential national security advisor Condoleezza Rice later commented, he was convinced that ‘democracy in the Arab heartland would in turn help democratize the Middle East and address the freedom gap that was the source of hopelessness and terrorism’ (p. 163).

Bush and his advisers seemed to believe that democracy was the ‘nature of things’ and that it would ‘spring forth organically’ if Washington ‘simply toppled Saddam and got the process moving’. The problem was that the Bush team confused the *beginning* of democratisation with the *accomplishment* of democratisation. For Brands, ‘the former task was something that could be accomplished through a rapid, low-cost invasion aimed at decapitating the regime. The latter was a process that, in most countries, had historically been long, bloody, and tumultuous’ (p. 177).

As is known to history, the revelation in the months following the invasion that Saddam’s WMD did not exist meant that the strategic rationale for the invasion collapsed at the same moment that the country began to unravel into sectarian violence and civil war. Brands accurately posits that the Bush administration did not fail to plan for the post-invasion period, but rather that its planning was ‘superficial and inadequate’. In 2003, White House budget chief Mitch Daniels predicted the war would cost \$50–60bn. By the end of Bush’s second term in early 2009, the price tag was \$86bn. Indirect costs totalled \$2–3 trillion, a sum that, when adjusted for inflation, represents the second-most expensive war in American history. It was an incredible total for an ‘operation that was supposed to be quick and decisive, and it raised the question of how an administration so concerned with grand strategy could have gotten its centerpiece so terribly wrong’ (p. 173).

Brands agrees with the conventional critique that the Iraq War ‘reinvigorated the global jihad’ after Afghanistan, including by providing a new generation of recruits in the heart of the Middle East. What is more, by 2008, once-successful Afghanistan was, according to Rice, ‘nearing catastrophic failure’ (p. 165). Rumsfeld had earlier convinced Bush to leave only 8,000 American troops in a country roughly the size of Texas. As James Dobbins, an American special envoy to the country in 2001–02, observed, ‘Afghanistan was the least resourced of any American nation-building enterprise in 60 years’ (p. 166).

What Good is Grand Strategy? contends that Bush's problem was not an absence of strategic thinking, but rather that his ideas were, from the beginning, simply too big, too optimistic, too unilateral, too demanding of American power and too insensitive to the risks associated with such messianic endeavours. CIA director George Tenet's comments on Iraq could equally apply to Bush's grand strategy as a whole: 'We followed a policy built on hope rather than fact' (p. 177). In the end, Bush's grand strategy produced an 'overextension, distortion and dissipation' of grand strategy (p. 189). Once triumphant with the fall of the Berlin Wall two decades earlier, American power 'seemed more beleaguered than at any time since the Cold War' (p. 145). Even for the mighty United States, there was 'great peril in trying to be too grand' (p. 189).

* * *

For a young academic historian, Brands has an unusually subtle and accurate sense of the challenges that US policymakers face in implementing grand strategies. He uses his conclusion to offer a number of keen insights and prescriptions that, at least according to this reviewer, one would have expected from someone who had spent repeated stints working in the US government. To start with, he observes that there is an inescapable tension between the audacity required to engage in grand strategy 'big think' and the 'small ball' technical competence required to turn any grand idea into an operational policy. Indeed, bureaucracy designed to provide continuity and non-partisan service can be an implacable foe of policy innovation – a source of frustration to a grand strategist eager to strike while the irons are hot. Brands's masterful work also serves as a reminder that the legacies of the more recent and controversial presidential foreign policies will need to be evaluated by subsequent generations not emotionally attached to the events themselves.

Brands's economical tome makes a much greater impact than one might expect from its 200-odd pages. If there is a quibble to be made, one might ask whether, while he acknowledges its significance, Brands fully accounts for the role fortune plays in determining whether these or any grand

strategies succeed or fail. Take the Iraq invasion, for example. If Bush had deployed another US division for the invasion and issued orders to shoot to kill looters, the outcome might have been far different, as would subsequent evaluations of Bush's grand-strategy 'wisdom' and 'competence'.

Brands wisely does not address the pressing contemporary question of whether President Barack Obama has pursued the right grand strategy. Given the number of think tanks and pundits that have written critically on this topic, one might assume that Obama has failed miserably in this vital effort.² Yet, if there is a lesson to be drawn from Brands's book that might help determine the what and how of the Obama doctrine, it is that we should be wary of muscular (and often, by extension, quite expensive) grand strategy in this age of austerity and inequality. In this sense, there might be something to Obama's apparent willingness to sometimes 'lead from behind' and 'hit singles' rather than 'swing for the fences' in foreign policy, despite the criticism that this approach has supposedly entailed relinquishing American supremacy.³ For Obama, *primum nil nocere* seems built upon the sober recognition that the quest by some of his predecessors to achieve a shining American grand strategy wound up causing enormous harm.

Notes

- 1 'Global Challenges and U.S. National Security Strategy', Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, 27 January 2015, <http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/15-01-27-global-challenges-and-us-national-security-strategy>. See also Peggy Noonan, 'America's Strategy Deficit', *Wall Street Journal*, 30 January 2015, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/americas-strategy-deficit-1422573879>; and Kate Brannen, 'Four-Star Critique', *Foreign Policy*, 27 January 2015, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/27/four-star-critique-obama-foreign-policy/>.
- 2 See, for example, William C. Martel, 'America's Grand Strategy Disaster', *National Interest*, 9 June 2014, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-grand-strategy-disaster-10627>; and Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy for his Second Term? If Not, He Could Try One of These', *Washington Post*, 18 January 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/does-obama-have-a-grand-strategy-for-his-second-term-if-not-he-could-try-one-of-these/2013/01/18/ec78cede-5f27-11e2-a389-ee565c81c565_story.html.
- 3 See, for example, Ryan Lizza, 'The Consequentialist: How the Arab

Spring Remade Obama's Foreign Policy', *New Yorker*, 2 May 2011, <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/05/02/the-consequentialist>; Scott Horsley, 'In Diplomacy, Obama Aims to "Hit Singles," Not Swing for Fences', NPR, 29 April 2014, <http://>

www.npr.org/2014/04/29/308068189/in-diplomacy-obama-aims-to-hit-singles-not-swing-for-the-fences; 'Obama: The Vox Conversation', Vox, <http://www.vox.com/a/barack-obama-interview-vox-conversation/obama-foreign-policy-transcript>.